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Walton v. Angelone
321 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2003)
L Facts
On November 26, 1996, the Danville Police Department entered the
residence of Elizabeth and Jessie Kendrick ("the Kendricks") upon notification
by their daughter that she could not contact them. Several officers discovered
the Kendricks' bodies in separate rooms and found that both had suffered "tight
contact" gunshot wounds to the top of the head indicating that they were shot
at close range. The Kendricks were last seen alive on November 19, 1996, at a
hospital in Danville. Police officers found the Kendricks' car a short distance
behind their townhouse!
On November 28, 1996, after his sister and parents were unable to reach
Archie Moore ("Moore"), Danville police officers entered Moore's residence in
the Cabin Lake Apartment Complex and found his body "in a closet behind a
suitcase," with a strong odor of cologne in both the closet and on his body.
Moore was the victim of a gunshot wound to the head and a bullet was discov-
ered on the floor of his apartment. Following the discovery of Moore's body,
two witnesses reported that they had observed Percy Levar Walton ("Walton")
driving Moore's Ford Mustang. Other witnesses observed Walton walking
between the area of the Kendricks' townhouse and the Cabin Lake complex "on
several occasions between November 19 and November 26, 1996." The police
found Moore's Mustang in front of the condominium Walton shared with his
parents.2
When police questioned Walton at his home, he denied that he was ever in
Moore's car.' After a subsequent search of Walton's residence, Moore's and the
Kendricks' cars, and Cabin Lake, a grand jury issued two separate indictments
against Walton that alleged capital murder and other felonies.4 Walton was
charged with the capital murder of Moore and the Kendricks in the commission
1. Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442,447 (4th Cr. 2003) (quoting Walton v. Common-
wealth, 501 S.E2d 134, 136 (Va. 1998)).
2. Id at 447-48 (citing Wa,4 501 SE.2d at 136-38).
3. Id at 448. Walton, accompanied by his father, agreed to go to the police department for
further questioning. Id
4. Id at 448-449. A search of the area surrounding Cabin Lake produced two 'partially
submerged" .32-caliber bullets. After the lale was drained police recovered a .32-caliber pistol that
Jessie Kendrick purchased in 1970. Ballistic tests matched the pistol to the bullets used in the
murder of both the Kendrichs and Moore. Id at 449. While Walton was awaiting trial, he admitted
to fellow inmates that "he had killed three people at Cabin Lake." Walton later described the
murders to a fellow inmate in the Danville tyJail. Id
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of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, the robbery of Moore and the
Kendricks, the use of a firearm during the commission of the capital murder of
Moore and the Kendricks, the use of a firearm during the commission of the
robbery of Moore and the Kendricks, the burglary of the Kendricks' home, and
"capital murder for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than
one person within a three-year period."' On October 7, 1997, Walton pleaded
guiltyto all charges.6 The trial court sentenced Walton to death for the capital
murder counts and to separate prison terms for the other counts.7
A. Prwxed Histwy
Walton filed a direct appeal in the Supreme Court of Virginia The court
affirmed the trial court's decision.' The United States Supreme Court denied
Walton's petition for a writ of certiorarL0
Walton filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus on February 5,1999,
but the Supreme Court of Virginia ordered Walton to file another petition that
did not exceed the court's fifty-page limit." On March 30, 1999, Walton filed a
revised fiftypage habeas petition and subsequently tried to add a claim under
5. Id at 449; seeVA. QODE ANN. S 182-31(4) (MchieSupp. 2003) (definingcapitalmurder
as "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of nperso the commission of robbery
or attempted robbery'); VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(8) (=lbie Supp. 2003) (defining capital murder
as '[tlhe willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person within a three-year
period"); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-53.1 c 1996) (defining when it s unlawful to use or display
a firearm in committing i felony); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-58 qvfichie 1996) (describing punishment
for robbery); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-90 (Michie Supp. 2003) (defining statutory burglary).
6. Waw, 321 F.3d at 449. Following Walton's plea colloquy the trial court stated on the
record that it conducted an inquiry of Walton and found that "the defendant has tendered a plea
of guilty to each of the charges ... has done so freely, voluntarily, intelligently, and with a full
knowledge and understanding of the consequences." Id at 457.
7. Id at 450. The State subsequentlydropped the section 182-31(8) charge. Id at 450 n.3.
8. Id at 450. Walton raised the following six claims on direct appeal (1) the trial court
violated Walton's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when crime
scene and autopsyphotos were shown to the jury over defense objections that theywere prejudicial;
(2) "the trial court erred in finding stipulated evidence" sufficient to convict Walton, in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) the trial court erred in finding evidence sufficient to
prove the statutory aggravator of future dangerousness, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments; (4) the trial court erred in finding evidence sufficient to prove the statutory aggrava-
tor of vileness, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (5)"(t]he sentence of death
was under the influence of passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor" in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments; (6) the sentence of death was disproportionate to penalties imposed
in similar cases in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id at 450 n.4.
9. Id at 450.
10. Id (citing Walton v. Virginia, 525 U.S. 1046, 1046 (1998) (mem.)).
11. Id at 450-51; see VA. SUP. Cr. R. 5:7A (limiting petitions for a writ of habeas corpus to
fiftypages unless a justice of the court grants permission to exceed the limit).
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Fonv Wainrtg2 citing his incompetence to be executed." Walton had in-
cluded his Foniclaim in his original, oversized, state petition, but failed to include
it in the shortened fiftypage petition. 4 The court denied Walton's request to
add the Fon claim.'"
In total, Walton raised nine claims in his state habeas petition.16 Of these,
the Supreme Court of Virginia, relying on Sla)n v Pamni,' 7 determined that
seven claims were procedurally defaulted.18 The court held that Walton's other
claims were either barred or warranted dismissal on the merits. 9 Walton's
execution date was set for December 16, 1999, but the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stayed the execution." Concurrently,
Walton sought review of the Supreme Court of Virginia's denial of habeas relief
in the United States Supreme Court.2 The Court denied Walton's petition for
a writ of certiorari.22
Walton filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia on March 24, 2000.23 Walton's federal habeas
petition contained the same claims as his March 30, 1999, state habeas petition,
but also included the additional Fod claim.24 The court held an evidentiary
hearing on Walton's Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims
12. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
13. Wam, 321 F.3d at 451; see Ford v. Waiawright, 477 US. 399,410 (1986) (holding that
a state may not execute an insane or incompetent prisoner).
14. Watai 321 F.3d at 451 n.7.
15. Id at 452.
16. Id at 451 n.6.
17. 205 S.E2d 680 (Va. 1974).
18. Walm, 321 F.3d at 451; seeSayton v. Panigan, 205 S.E.2d 680,682 (Va. 1974) (holding
that claims not raised at trial or on direct appeal are not cognizable on state habeas petition).
19. Wam, 321 F.3d at 451-52; see Anderson v. Warden, 281 S.E.2d 885, 888 (Va. 1981)
(holding "that the truth and accuracy of representations made byan accused as to the adequacy of
his court-appointed counsel and the voluntariness of his guilryplea will be considered conclusively
establishedby the trial proceedings, unless the prisoner offers a valid reason why he should be
permitted to controvert his prior statements"). Claim VIII(A)(10) charged that Walton's counsel
rendered ineffective assistance byunreasonablyfaling to withdrawhis guiltyplea, and claim VIII(C)
charged that Wakon's counsel rendered ineffective assistance on appeal. Wakm, 321 F.3d at 451
n6. In the federal habeas proceedings, the Commonwealth "waived any reliance on A ndmsom as a
ground for dismissal of any of Walton's claims.- Id at 461 & n.17.
20. Wa/tan, 321 F.3d at 452.
21. Id Walton sought adeterminationof whetherVirginia's habeas reviewsystem, as applied
to death row inmates, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Id The case was subsequentlytransferred to the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia. Id
22. Id; Walton v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 1076, 1076 (2000) (mer.).
23. Wa/tm, 321 F.3d at 452.
24. Id at 451-52.
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and issued an opinion on March 27,2002. The court upheld the state court bar
of the claims defaulted under S/arat, but it refused to "give effect to the A ndenson
procedural bar," addressing the claims denozu it denied them on the merits.26 On
the claim that Walton's counsel rendered ineffective assistance on appeal, the
district court ruled that the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision to deny this
claim was not "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" Stri/land v
WasbitV= The district court without prejudice dismissed as premature
Walton's Fon clain 2 On July 22, 2002, Walton appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Crcuit and applied for a certificate of
appealability. 9
B. CwpdvxyExtezt
When Walton's trial counsel, Lawrence Gott, moved for appointment of an
expert for the sentencing hearing under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1, the
state trial court appointed Dr. Stanton E. Samenow ("Dr. Samenow"), a licensed
clinical psychologist, to assist in preparing and presenting mitigation evidence.3"
25. Id at 452.
26. Id
27. Id; see 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to a
state court decision on the merits can onlybe granted if the state court decision "was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States"; part of AEDPA); Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668,
687, 694 (1984) (creating a two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in which
the defendant must show objectively unreasonable performance by counsel that prejudiced the
defendant). The district court stated that it would first hear evidence on the performance prong
of the Stidar test, and that it would hear evidence only on the substantive competency and
prejudice claims if it found deficient performance. Id 7his is an opposite use of the test as found
under Wofmd V isoxt, inwhich the Supreme Court of California presumed ineffective assistance
before determining prejudice. Woodford v. Visciott, 537 U.S. 19, 21 (2002) (per curiam). For a
complete discussion and analysis of WaWd, swegrmvlyPhilip R Yoon, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.
J. 427 (2003) (analyzing Woodford v. Visciotti, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002)).
28. Wakm, 321 F.3d at 452; sm Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 US. 637, 643-44 (1998)
(holding that the second petition claiming incompetence for execution was not barred as successive
under28 U.S.C S 2244). The Fourth Circuit, which denied Waltons certificate of appealability, also
dismissed his Foniclaim as premature. Watwn 321F.3d at 467 n21. Under Stmuwt this claim is not
considered successive for purposes of AEDPA and can be renewed in later petitions. 28 U.S.C S
2244 (2000); Stcrwt 523 U.S. at 643-44. However, this claim must be asserted on each successive
petition at both the state and federal levels for a writ of habeas corpus lest it be procedurally
defaulted. Sw Colburn v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 968, 968 (2003) (mem.) (denying writ of certioran); see
also Colbum v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 512-13 (Tex. Cuim. App. 1998) (involving a Foni claim that
was not asserted in the initial federal habeas petition even though the Ford claim would have failed
for ripeness if claimed inthe iapetition). For a complete discussion and analysis of Oim, see
generallyKristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 517 (2003) (analyzing Colbumv. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 968 (2003) (men.))
29. Watan, 321 F.3d at 452.
30. Watan, 321 F.3d at 453; s&-VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.3:1 (Mlchie Supp. 2003) (explain-
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The court instructed Dr. Samenow to "submit a report to Gott concerning
Walton's 'history and character' and'mental condition at the time of the offense.'
")31 Gott had observed several instances of strange behavior by Walton and
informed Dr. Samenow of their occurrences. 2 Dr. Samenow conducted an
evaluation of Walton fromMarch 12,1997 until March 14,1997 and interviewed
Walton and members of his family on April 29, 1997."3 In the March and April
evaluations Dr. Samenow found nothing that indicated to him that Walton was
incompetent to stand trial34
In July 1997 Gott observed that Walton again was exhibiting behavior
inconsistent with competence and requested that Dr. Samenow evaluate Walton
once more to determine his sanity at the time of the offenses." Dr. Samenow
met with Walton on both July 11, 1997 and July 14, 1997 and reached different
results than his earlier evaluations. 36 Dr. Samenow "noted a marked change in
Walton's 'demeanor and mode of expression.' "" On July 14, "Walton was
'more responsive to very specific questions, but then he would again go off the
track' 3  Following his July evaluations, Dr. Samenow recommended that
ing when the assistance of a mental health expert is available to a capital defendant). The Fourth
Crcuit noted that another attorneyfromthe Danville Public Defender's Office was appointed along
with Gott, but that "Gott essentiallywas the lead counsel in the case." Wamn, 321 F3d at 453 n.8.
The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse recommends the assignment of at least two attorneys in
capital defense litigation. This recommendation is in accord with the ABA guidelines. See ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,
Guideline 4.1 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Guidelines for Death Penalty Defense] (suggesting that
"defense team should consist of no fewer than two attorneys qualified in accordance with Guideline
5.1, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist"). The ABA Guidelines also suggest the appointment
of a mitigation specialist, which the Clearinghouse also endorses. ABA Guidelines for Death
PenaltyDefense, Guideline 4.1. For a motion requesting the appointment of a mitigation specialist,
please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540)458-8557.
31. Waa, 321 F.3d at 453.
32. Id at 453-54. Gott reported that at times Walton did not seem to understand what his
attorneys were telling him or did not like what they told him. Id at 453. Gott also reported that
Walton exhibited "nervous laughter and drumming." Id Walton claimed that he could not be seen
when his eyes were closed and "he described groups within the jail which he called 'the mob' and
the 'one times' that he could move between with inpunity." Id Walton also called his attorneys'
offices repeatedly, and once threatened suicide in order to gain one of his attorney's attention. Id
at 454 n.10.
33. Id at 454.
34. Id at 455.
35. Id at 454.
36. Id
37. Wakt; 321 F.3d at 454. On July 11, "Dr. Samenow described Walton's speech as 'run-
on,' 'not responsive' to the subject of discussion, 'unintelligible, at least to me,' profane, and
violent." Id
38. Id On July14, "[flor the first time, Walton related a belief he 'read ... in the Bible,' that
after he died he would 'come back as a new person.' " Id (alteration in origina).
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Walton be placed in a secure psychiatric hospital for further evaluation and to
prevent him from harming himself or others?9 Upon hearing this recommenda-
tion, Gott petitioned the trial court under Virginia Code section 19.2-169.6(1) to
have Walton immediately hospitalized in a state "forensic mental health
facility." ' Dr. Samenow, however, refused to declare Walton mentally ill.
Because section 19.2-169.6(1) requires a diagnosis of mental illness for hospital-
ization, the motion was denied.42 Although Dr. Samenow"believed that hospi-
talization was the best option," he "could not diagnose Walton as mentallyil1 ."43
In August 1997 Dr. Samenowsubmitted a report of his findings and conclusions
to the court." Based on his March and April evaluations, Dr. Samenow con-
cluded that Walton was competent for trial despite his July evaluations.'
Also in August, pursuant to a request byGott for a competencyevaluation,
the state trial court issued an order appointing Dr. Mfiller Ryans ("Dr. Ryans") to
conduct a forensic evaluation of Walton." In his report, Dr. Ryans found
39. Id at 455. In his July interviews, Dr. Samenow found Walton to be "much different"
from the March and April interviews. Id at 454. Dr. Samenow explained Walton's mode of
expression: "This man articulated his thoughts in ways that I simply could not comprehend... He
sirnplywould go off on a tangent seemingly irrelevant to what we were discussing." Id at 455.
40. Id; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.6(1) (Michie 2000) (authorizing a court to order that
an incarcerated defendant receive emergencypre-trial hospitalization if the court finds by"clearand
convincing evidence" that the defendant "is mentallyill and immediatelydangerous to self or others
in the opinion of a qualified mental health professional," and "requires treatment in a hospital rather
than the jail in the opinion of a qualified mental health professional").
41. Wato, 321 F.3d at 455.
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id Dr. Samenow's August 22, 1997 report provided details of Walton's upbringing:
According to the reprt, Walton had a normal ubringin up until his teens when,
according to h mother, his personaltchanged because'he beca, "nvolved withpeers who used dnugs and alCohoL walton was explled from SChOOl in the tenthgrade because he ha'w different charges for possession of a firearm Following his
expulsion from school, Walton spnt a month at Natural Bridge Juvenile Correctional
Center. Because Walton cratedno problems and ha no instiuinal offenses at the
center, Dr. Samenow observed that Walton, in a structured situation,' was able to
impress others.
df at 454 nll.
45. Id at 455-56. Dr. Samenow concluded Walton was competent despite having reasons




Walton competent to stand trial." Dr. Ryans also notified Gott by letter "that
he found Walton 'competent to plead and assist'" in his defense. 8
Following the completion of a jurytrial waiver form, a guilty plea question-
naire, and extensive questioning by the court, Walton pleaded guilty to all
charges."9 The state trial court found his plea to be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntaryand accepted his guiltypleas. s° Despite Walton's earlier expressed wish
to be executed, Gott presented a case for life at the sentencing hearing." How-
ever, Gott did not present incompetency evidence in mitigation, but instead
presented evidence that Walton took "responsibility for his actions by pleading
guilty" and that Walton was a young man who had "upstanding citizens" willing
to testify on his behalf."2 Gott chose this strategy over a mental illness strategy
for several reasons." First, Gott believed that he lacked the mental health
evidence that would have proven incompetence.' Also, interviews with Walton's
familydid not reveal a historyof mental illness."5 Further, Gott was reluctant to
call either Dr. Samenow or Dr. Ryans to the stand." Gott also knew that Walton
had told fellow inmates that "he intended to 'play crazy.' " Finally, Walton had
been tried previously on charges of burglary and grand larceny and the issue of
incompetence had never been raised. 8
47. Waat, 321 F.3d at 456. Dr. Ryans concluded "that Walton had a satisfactory under-
standing of the proceedings against him and a 'workable level of ability to assist in his own
defense.'" Id Dr. Ryans further concluded "that Walton, not only had an understanding of the
charges against him, but also had an understanding of the roles of the judge, the jury, the Common-
wealth's attorney, and the witnesses." Id
48. Id Dr. Ryans indicated at a federal evidentiary hearing that Walon's behavior in the
interviews with Dr. Samenow "might have been attributable to malingering, the long-term effects
of cocaine use, his limited intellectual functioning, and stress." Id at 456 n.14.
49. Id at 457.
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id Gott had Walton's Little League coach, some of his school teachers, two of his aunts,
one of his former counselors at a juvenile detention center, and his grandmother testify on Walton's
behalf. Id at 457-58. Gott did not present Walton's mother because Walton had once been
charged with assaulting her and she had also been charged and convicted with embezzlement. Id
at 458 n.15.
53. Wactn, 321 F.3d at 458.
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id Gott was hesitant to call Dr. Samenow, in particular, as a witness because past






Walton exhibited more questionable behavior at his sentencing hearing.59
When Walton "laughed, smiled, and waved to family members," Gott advised
him to "keep his head down or focus on a spot."6' During victim impact testi-
mony one of the Kendricks' grandchildren remarked that she hoped the court
had taken note of Walton's "smiles and laughter over the course of the proceed-
ings." 61 Walton also refused to return to the courtroom after rebuttal testimony
bytwo jail deputies. 2 The court asked Dr. Samenow to coerce Walton to return
to the courtroom and when this failed deputies maced and shackled Walton.63
Dr. Samenow told the trial court that Walton's behavior was the result of being
scared; Dr. Samenow did not mention the possibility of incompetence.'
II. Hdding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, having found
that Walton failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right, denied his application for a certificate of appealability and dismissed the
appeal.6' The court held that: (1) Walton was competent to stand trial and plead
guilty,6 (2) that Walton's attomeyrendered effective assistance despite not raising
the issue of Walton's incompetence at trial or on appeal;6 (3) Walton's guiltyplea
was knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily given;" (4) Walton's attorney rendered
effective assistance when he did not object to a medical expert; 69 and (5) Walton's
attorney acted reasonably in the investigation and presentation of mitigating
mental health evidence."0
III. A nisi
For a certificate of appealabilityto issue, an applicant must make "a substan-
tial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.""' This standard was refined




63. Id at 458-59.
64. Id at 459.
65. Waaw, 321 F.3d at 446 (citing 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(2) (2000) (explaining the standard for
issuing a certificate of appealability, part of AEDPA)).
66. Id at 460.
67. Id at 461-62.
68. Id at 462-63.
69. Id at 465.
70. Id at 466.
71. 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(2) (2000).
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by the United States Supreme Court in Sa&k v McDaniel," which states that a
petitioner must show that "reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner
or that the issues presented 'were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.'" 73 Walton raised the following five claims in his petition for a certificate
of appealability. (1) he was not competent to stand trial or plead guilty,4 (2) his
attomeyrendered ineffective assistance bynot raising the issue of his incompe-
tence at trial or on appeal;7 (3) his plea was not knowingly, willingly, and volun-
tarily given;76 (4) his attorney rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object
to a medical expert;77 and (5) his attomeyunreasonably failed to investigate and
present mitigating mental health evidence.78
A. Cwpavmy
Walton raised both a substantive and a procedural competency claim."
Walton's substantive claim alleged that he was not competent to plead guilty or
to stand trial.80 I-fis procedural claim alleged that Gott was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to raise the issue of competency at trial and on direct
appeal. 1
1. Sulstamw Cam
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from prosecuting incom-
petent defendants.82 The Court formulated a test for competency in Dusky v
72. 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
73. Wamn, 321 F.3d at 453 (qui Slack v. McDaniel, 529 US. 473,483-84 (2000)); se
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (stating that when a habeas applicant seeks permission to initate appellate
review, the court of appeals should engage in a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of his
claims to determine if " jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim"); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983) (defining the requirements for the
"substantial showing" standard eventually codified in 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(2)); swaso Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 US. 322, 336-38 (2003) (applying "substantial showing" standard of S 2253); Priya
Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 407 (2003) (analyzing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. C. 1029
(2003)).
74. Wattn 321 F.3d at 459.
75. Id at 461.
76. Id at 462.
77. Id at 463.
78. Id at 465.
79. Id at 453.
80. Waim; 321 F.3d at 453.
81. Id
82. Id at 459; sw Pate v. Robinson, 383 US. 375, 384-86 (1966) (holding that once "bona
fide doubt" of defendant's competence is raised by defense counsel, a hearing on that issue is
2003]
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Urita1State,3 in which it held that a defendant is competent if he has the ability
to confer rationally with his attorney and if he has a rational and factual under-
standing of the charges."
Walton argued that he was not competent to plead guilty or stand trial."5
The Fourth Circuit stated that, in a substantive competency claim, there is no
presumption of incompetency and a defendant must prove his incompetency by
a preponderance of the evidence under the test from Bwket u A rIone.6 In
addition, the Broket court stated that manifestations of mental illness do not
necessarily indicate incompetence to stand trial; instead, the evidence must
demonstrate an inabilityto assist counsel or understand the charges. 7 The Bwket
court also found that" 'neither low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor bizarre,
volatile, and irrational behavior can be equated with mental incompetence to
stand trial.' -88
The Fourth Circuit "harborfed] no doubt that Walton was competent to
appear in court and plead guilty." 9 The court held first that Walton exhibited a
"'sophisticated understanding'" of the proceedings throughout their duration.0
Second, the court held that despite Walton's behavior during his July interviews
with Dr. Samenow and during the sentencing hearing, his actions were not
conclusive to either Dr. Samenow or Dr. Ryans that Walton was incompetent to
proceed." The court also stated that the "potent strength" of the examinations
led Gott to forgo anyclaim of incompetence at trial.92 The court concluded that
required).
83. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
84. Duskyv. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that a defendant
is competent if he -has sufficient present abilityto consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him"); se Wakn, 321 F.3d at 459 (quoting Dztk6 362 U.S. at 402).
85. Waharn 321 F.3d at 459.
86. I d; Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Gr. 2000) (describing the defendant's
burden of proof in a substantive competency claim).
87. Watcn 321 F.3d at 460 (citing Bwke, 208 F.3d at 192).
88. Id (quoting Bwke, 208 F.3d at 192).
89. Id
90. Id (quoting Bwket 208 F.3d at 192). The court cited Walton's ability to complete the
guilty plea questionnaire as well as his cogent responses during his plea colloquy as support for its
conclusion. Id
91. Id The Fourth Circuit stated that "[tihe thorough evaluations by the mental health
experts provide powerful evidence that Walton was competent to appear in court and plead guilty
on October 7, 1997 and at the sentencing phase of his case." Id (citing Bwk, 208 F.3d at 193-94
(stating that the fact that the petitioner's and the prosecution's mental health experts did not find
the petitioner incompetent was probative of the fact that the petitioner was competent)).
92. Id (citing Burke, 208 F.3d at 192-93 (finding that the fact that counsel did not raise the
issue of competency provided powerful evidence that the petitioner was competent)).
254 [Vol. 16:1
WALTON V ANGELONE
reasonable jurists could not disagree that Walton was competent at the time of
his plea and at sentencing."
2. A fwal 0aim
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence."94 In Strida"d v Wasb;i* 9 s the United
States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees effective
assistance of counsel to all defendants.96 Walton argued that Gott was consitu-
tionallyineffective for failing to raise an incompetencyclaim at trial and on direct
appeal.
97
In Stridka4 the Court established a two-pronged test for determining
whether counsel's assistance is constitutionally ineffective.98 Under the first
prong, the petitioner must show that counsel's assistance was below an objective
standard of reasonableness." The second prong requires a petitioner to establish
prejudice byshowing "a reasonable probabilitythat, but for counsel's unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."'0 The
Fourth Circuit held that Walton's claim failed both prongs of Sbid/ar' 0 '
The court cited four reasons why Walton's claim failed under the reason-
ableness prong."' First, the court found that the large amount of background
information collected byGott, which included Walton's denial of a familyhistory
of mental illness, was evidence of the reasonableness of Gott's actions. 103
Second, the court found that Gott's motion for an expert to aid in mitigation was
evidence of reasonableness, in that it helped to induce the state trial court to
order a competency evaluation.' Third, the fact that Gott gave Dr. Ryans the
report compiled by Dr. Samenow, which contained information on Walton's
upbringing and lifestyle, was reasonable.0 Fourth, the court found that the fact
that Dr. Samenownever suggested to Gott that Walton was incompetent, despite
93. Waan, 321 F.3d at 460 (citing Slack, 529 US. at 484).
94. US. CONST. amend. VI.
95. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
96. Stridear* 466 US. at 685-86 (holding that the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees effective assistance of counsel to all defendants).
97. Wa/n, 321 F.3d at 461.
98. Soi&Lma 466 US. at 687-88.
99. Id at 687,691.
100. Id at 694.
101. Wa/zn, 321 F.3d at 461-62.






Walton's behavior, was evidence of Gott's reasonableness."' The court con-
cluded that Gott's performance was "more than reasonable" under Stridlan 07
The court also found that Walton was not prejudiced byGott's decision not
to pursue the competency issue.08 Based on the record, the court found that
Walton was competent at the time of his guilty pleas and during sentencing;
therefore, Walton was not prejudiced byGott's decision not to raise the compe-
tency issue."' For these reasons, the court found that reasonable jurists Could
not disagree with the district court's determination of Gott's effectiveness."'
B. Kwuh Ioa gn, and Vd ay P/Am
Walton claimed that his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary."' The Fourth Crcuit applied the standard from Nonih Gruam u
A #W 12 to determine whether Walton's guiltyplea was a voluntaryand intelligent
choice amid the alternative choices presented to hirn."3  The court found no
evidence that Walton "was forced, coerced, threatened, or improperly induced
into pleading guilty... to demonstrate that his representations were untruthful
or involuntary." "4 Because the court found no reason to believe that any coer-
cion was present in the state court proceedings, it found that Walton was bound
by his representations to the trial court."1 '
The Fourth Carcuit further held that there was no evidence that Walton's
guiltypleas were involuntarybecause of incompetence."' Citing the two separate
reports byDr. Samenow and Dr. Ryans, the court found no indication from the
experts that Walton's pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."7 To
106. Id at 461-62.
107. Wata 321 F.3d at 462.
108. Id
109. Id
110. Id (citing Slade, 529 US. at 484).
111. Id
112. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
113. Wata 321 F-3d at 462; seeNorth Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,31(1970) (stating the
test for determining whether a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary).
114. Wat 321 F.3d at 462; seBradyv. United States, 397 US. 742,748-50 (1970) (holding
that a guilty plea is made knowingly and intelligently if a defendant is fully aware of the conse-
quences of his guilty plea and makes his choice voluntarily).
115. Watn, 321 F.3d at 462; seFields v. Attorney Gen., 956 F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cr. 1992)
("Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound bythe representations
he makes under oath during a plea colloquy."); Bnay 397 US. at 750 ("Of course, the agents of the
State maynot produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm orbymental coercion overbear-
ing the will of the defendant.*).




that end, the court found that" 'reasonable jurists' could not disagree with the
district court's determination that Walton's guilty pleas" were valid."'
C C ti=i yEfftiu Ass ,n qfCad
Walton also claimed that Gott denied him constitutionally effective assis-
tance of counsel by failing to object to the appointment of Dr. Samenow."'
Walton first objected to the appointment of Dr. Samenowin his state and federal
habeas petitions because of Dr. Samenow's unorthodox views regarding mental
illness and its connection with the commission of crime. 20 Walton claimed that,
with a different expert, a diagnosis of schizophrenia would have been forthcom-
ing and would have led to a life sentence when combined with other mitigating
evidence.'2  Walton relied on Ake va CkLza 2'  and Virginia Code section
118. Id (quoting Slzk, 529 US. at 484).
119. Id at 463.
120. Id at 463-64. Dr. Samenow's views do not conform to mainstream ps-dhiatric practice.
Id at 464. Dr. Samenow stated at the federal evidentiary hearing that "[c]rine resides with the
individual,... environmental factors can make crime easier or more difficult to commit, (but] the
origin of crime is within the individual" Id at 463 (alteration in original). The Fourth Crcuit
discussed Dr. Samenov/s beliefs as expressed in his evidentiary hearing testimony.
[Dr. Samenow believes] environmental factors do not cause crime, rather what causes
crime is how a defendant "chooses] to deal with whatever life's circumstances are.*
Furthermore, Dr. Samenow "downpla ,s] ... the existence of mental illness as being
something that motivates the defed- Tnus, in Dr. Samenows o oupin, "a
defendant, even if he otherwise may be diagnosed as mentally ill, is abe to make
choices about his conduct."
Id (alterations in original. Dr. Samenow also stated that he understood "why a defense attorney
might not think that I was the best person in terms of the search for mitigating factors, given the
positions that I've taken through what I have written." Id at 464. Dr. Samenow's views led Judge
Mumaghan in another case to state:
Dr. Stanton Samenow's professed and public views make him inco.mpetent to aid a
defendant in finding ana preseting mitigating factors at a defendant's sentencing
phase .... H has aandoned sociologic pshlogic, and mental illness elanations
for criminal behavior and holks the vie that most diagposes of mental iles i
criminals resulted from the criminal's fabrications .... .Dr. Samenow's published
works state that circumstances have nothing to do with criminal violations and that
providing the criminal with an opportunity to present excuses deferred him and us
further Ld further from change .... Dr. Samenow's views obviate his ability to
evaluate mi't igati factors relating to the history or character of a criminal defendant
because he is of tee opinion that no mitigating factors exist.
Id (quotin Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F3d 396,411 n.1 (4th Cr. 1999) (vlumaghanJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
121. Id at 463.
122. 470 US. 68 (1985).
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19.2-264.3:1 to support his claim' 23 Under Ake, if a defendant can amake a
showing that "his mental state is at issue in his defense of the charges," then the
defendant has a right to the aid of a mental health expert.'24 Virginia Code
section 19.2-264.3:1 implements the requirements of Ake and also explains that
expert assistance is required to assist the defense in the investigation and presen-
tation of mitigating evidence.
21
Gott admitted at the federal evidentiary hearing that Dr. Samenow would
not have been his choice "if he had his druthers," but claimed a good working
relationship with Dr. Samenow.126 Gott previously read a treatise written byDr.
Samenow and decided that his views were not "defendant-friendly."'
Despite Gott's concerns about the appointment of Dr. Samenow, the
Fourth Circuit held that Walton failed to show sufficient prejudice. 12  Walton
was required to demonstrate that the trial court or the Supreme Court of Virginia
" 'would have either removed Dr. Samenow upon objection or appointed an
additional expert upon request.' "129 The Fourth Circuit held that "Walton
cannot meet this standard." 30 First, the court found that Walton did not have
a constitutional right to pick his expert.' Second, the court ruled that Dr.
Samenow's unorthodox views had no effect on his evaluation of Walton.
3 2
Third, according to the court, Dr. Samenow's views would not have prevented
him from diagnosing Walton with schizophrenia.'33 The court cited the concur-
rence of diagnosis, or lack of diagnosis, between Dr. Samenow and Dr. Ryans,
even though Dr. Ryans's views on mental illness and crime differed from those
123. Waan, 321 F.3d at 463; VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.3:1 (Mlchie Supp. 2003) (defining
when the assistance of a mental health expert is available to a capital defendant); see Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 US. 68,82-83 (1985) (holding that the need for the appointment of a mental health
expert is "readily apparent" when "the defendant is able to make an exparte threshold showing to
the trial court that his sanity is likelyto be a significant factor in his defense").
124. Wa, 321 F.3d at 463 (citing Ake 470 US. at 82-83).
125. Id (citing VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1).
126. Id at 464.
127. Id
128. Id; seRarass, 187 F.3d at 410 (holding that a defendant could not prove rejudice in
the appointment of Dr. Samenow). Ramdass made the same ineffective assistance caim for his
attorney's failure to object to the appointment of Dr. Samnow, and the Fourth Crcuit found that
he had suffered no prejudice and failed the second prong of Sntk/ard Rarlws, 187 F.3d at
409-10; see Stoilan, 466 U.S. at 694 (holding that under the second prong of the ineffective
assistance test a defendant must show prejudice).
129. Wam 321 F.3d at 464 (quoting Ramizas, 187 F.3d at 410).
130. Id
131. Id (citing A k4 470 U.S. at 83 and Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 401-02 (4th Cr.
1998)); swealsoVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1(A) (Mfichie Supp. 2003) (stating that "[tlhe defendant
shall not be entitled to a mental health expert of the defendant's own choosing").
132. Wado; 321 F.3d at 464.
133. Id
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of Dr. Samenow.'34 Lastly, the court held that evidence of Walton's mental state
was not "logically consistent" with Gott's defense strategyat sentencing."' 5 The
court concluded that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the district court's
finding that Gott did not deprive Walton of constitutionally effective assistance
of counsel when Gott failed to object to the appointment of Dr. Samenow."6
D. Mit jg Me"ta Hailt E We=
Walton further claimed that Gott "unreasonably failed to investigate and
present mitigating mental health evidence." 3' Walton's specific claim involved
the strategy used by Gott at his sentencing hearing. 3 Walton disagreed with
Gott's strategy to:
[P]ortray Walton as a young man who, although he had committed
three murders, nevertheless bad taken responsibility for his actions by
pleading guilty and who, in the relatively recent past, had been such a
good young man that upstanding citizens of the community were
willing to speak on his behalf despite what he had done. 39
Gott used this strategy because he thought it was the most likelyto result in a life
sentence. 40 Walton argued that Gott should have attempted "to show that
Walton was a schizophrenic who could be treated with medication to reduce his
dangerousness and that it was his mental illness that accounted for his behavior
at sentencing." 141
The court held that Walton could not show that "Gott's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." 142  The court found Gott's
assistance reasonable because: (1) Gott never received anyfamilyhistoryindicat-
ing mental illness; (2) neither Dr. Samnenow nor Dr. Ryans ever suggested that
Walton was mentally ill; (3) Dr. Ryans's testimony was suspect because Walton
had falsely told him that he was not guilt , (4) a mental health defense would
have "opened up the door" for other damaging testimonyindicating that he had
faked his mental illness; (5) in a previous trial, Walton's mental state was never
in question; and (6) the only evidence of Walton's mental illness was contained
134. Id
135. Id
136. Id at 465 (citing Slade, 529 U.S. at 484).
137. Id




142. Id (citing Stide/arh 466 US. at 687).
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in two inadmissible reports, an affidavit, and reports by three separate psychia-
trists that Walton submitted belatedly.43 The court ruled that because Gott's
tactical decision to pursue a strategy other than a mental illness defense was not
objectively unreasonable, Walton could not prove that Gott's strategy was
constitutionallydeficient.'" The court concluded that "reasonable jurists" could
not disagree with the district court's finding that Gott was not unreasonable in
his investigation and presentation of mitigating mental health evidence. "'
IV. Appzia'i in Vhim~z.
A. Failur toCtetoSaeain19.2-264.3:1 Expert
Section 19.2-264.3:1(A) guarantees an indigent capital defendant a mitiga-
tion expert, but provides that a defendant is not entitled to his own choice of
expert.146 Nonetheless, a motion for the appointment of an expert should
include a nominee for the appointment and an estimate of the cost of the pro-
posed expert.147 In Vivon Cy,1 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that the trial court's refusal to grant a request for a DNA expert was proper in
part because the request was "somewhat vague."'49 The necessity of estimating
costs requires the selection of a particular expert while being careful to avoid a
court-selected expert. The estimate should include the hourly fee of the nomi-
nated expert, the estimated hours for which the expert will be needed, anytravel
costs that are incurred by the expert when interviewing the defendant and
appearing in court, and any other relevant costs associated with the employment
of the expert. Although the trial court is not required to grant the motion
appointing the defense counsel's nominee, the inclusion of an estimate of the
cost will help make the motion more attractive.
If the motion including a nomination is denied by the court, the court will
likely appoint an expert of its own choosing. Unlike Gott, defense counsel
should avoid procedural default by objecting to the appointment of the chosen
expert. Gott's failure to object led to a chain reaction of adverse ineffective
143. Id at 465-66.
144. Wa4m, 321 F.3d at 466.
145. Id (citing Sladk, 529 US. at 484).
146. Sw VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3.1(A) (Mdichie Supp. 2003) (providing for a court-
appointed mental health expert).
147. The inclusion of acost estimate is essential because the granting of asection 19.2-264:3.1
expert is predicated on the court finding the defendant is unable to pay for the assistance on his
own. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 192-264:3.1(A) (requiring a "finding bythe court that the defendant
is financial unable to pay for expert assistance).
148. 522 S.Ed 170 (Va. 1999).
149. SeeVinsonv. Commonwealth,522 S.2d 170,175-76 (Va. 1999) (holdingthat trialcourt
did not err in refusing defendant a DNA expert when the defendant did not find such an expert
when granted leave to do so).
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assistance of counsel rulings in Walton's state and federal habeas proceedings.
Even if defense counsel is confident that any objection would be fruitless, as
section 19.2-264.3:1 might lead her to believe, defense counsel should object and
request time to find a new nominee with a revised estimate of cost. A failure to
object to the appointment of the expert at trial leaves the habeas counsel with
only an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. That claim will face Strik/ads
difficult two-pronged test.
In Husske v Qnr,,y dth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
Due Process Clause requires the Commonwealth to provide an indigent defen-
dant with the basic tools of an adequate defense."5' A motion for an expert,
other than a mitigation expert, will be granted only upon a showing that the
subject necessitating the expert is a significant factor in the defendant's defense
and a showing of particularized need.'52 As Vuian makes clear, Huske motions
should include both the showing of particularized need and the nomination
material discussed above.
Counsel had a strong case against the appointment of Dr. Samenow as a
section 19.2-264.3:1 expert. Dr. Samenow admitted in federal court that he does
not share with his colleagues a common view of the relationship between crime
and mental illness and that he understands why defense counsel would not want
him appointed to assist.' Indeed, as Judge Murnaghan stated in Ramas v
A rrgcw,15, Dr. Samenow's views prevented him from finding mitigating factors
because he does not believe that mitigating factors exist.15  Section
19.2-264.3:1(A) states that one of the duties of a 3:1 expert is to find out
"whether there are any other factors in mitigation relating to the history or
character of the defendant or the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
offense."' 5' If Dr. Samenow did not believe that mental condition mitigating
factors exist, he could not possibly fulfill the duties of a section 19.2-264.3:1
expert.
B. Ford Issue
Walton did not include his Foniclaimin his revised state habeas petition but
tried unsuccessfully to add it later."' The federal district court and the Fourth
150. 476 S.E2d 920 (Va. 1996).
151. Husske v. Gommonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920,925 (Va. 1996) (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 77).
152. Id at 925-26 (citing Ake, 470 US. at 82-83).
153. Wa/ta 321 F.3d at 463-64.
154. 187 F.3d 396 (4th ar. 1999).
155. Wam4 321 F.3d at 464; Rarizs, 187 F.3d at 411 n.1 (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
156. Se VA. CODE ANN. S 191-264.3:1(A) (Michie Supp. 2003) (requiring the appointed
expert to aid in the evaluation of the defendant for possible mental healh mitigating factors).
157. Wakrm, 321 F.3d at 451; Fonra 477 US. at 410 (holding that it is unconstitutional to
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Circuit dismissed, without prejudice, Walton's Foni claim in the federal habeas
proceedings."' 8 Arguably, because Walton did not include his Fon claim in his
state habeas petitions, the issue was procedurally defaulted in later petitions.'5 9
The best practice, therefore, is to include any Ford claim in all state and federal
habeas petitions.
Although the Fourth Crcuit applied the rationale of Ste mat v Marvmz-
VillanraP without hesitation, there is a question as to whether Swazrt is still the
law.16' In denying a writ of certiorari in CA = v Tecas,62 the United States
Supreme Court refused to hear the Foniclaim of a defendant who did not include
the claim in the initial federal habeas petition.163 But, because Colburn did not
raise a Fondclaim in his first habeas petition, Swuar may still be the law.'6 As a
result, it is unclear whether Cdium overrules Steumt. Therefore, if defense
counsel has any indication that the defendant is or may become incompetent to
be executed, she must assert the Font claim in every petition.
In Virginia, because the Commonwealth has not opted into S 2263, a
defendant has one year to file an initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
2244 following the close of state proceedings. 65 While a Fon claim may not
be a second or successive petition, it may possibly violate the statute of limita-
tions if it is considered an initial petition in subsequent habeas proceedings.
Stwmat seems to eliminate this problem by holding that a defendant is not
required to seek permission to file a second or successive petition and that the
execute an insane prisoner).
158. War, 321 F.3d at 452,467 n21;sa Sew=7, 523 US. at 643-44 (1998) (holding that a
second petition claiming incompetence for execution is not barred as successive under 28 U.S.C
S 2244 if the claim was asserted in the initial petition).
159. See28 U.S.C S 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2000) (stating that unless state procedure is ineffective,
a writ of habeas corpus must not issue; part of AEDPA).
160. 523 US. 637 (1998).
161. Wam, 321 F.3d at 467 n.21; se Steur, 523 U.S. at 643-45 (holding that the second
habeas petition claiming incompetence for execution was not barred as successive under 28 U.S.C
§2244).
162. 123 S. Ct. 968 (2003) (mem.).
163. Colbum v. Texas, 123 S. 0. 968, 968 (2003) (mem.) (denying petition for writ of
certiorari).
164. See Colburn v. Cockrell, No. H-02-4180, at 1, 4 (SD. Tex Nov. 6, 2002) (noting the
absence of a Foniclaim and denying Colburn's request for a Stay of Execution); Grunewald, sAp,
note 28, at 517-18 (noting Colburn's failure to raise a Foniclaim in his initial habeas petition).
165. Sw 28 U.S.C S 2244(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a defendant has one year to file a federal
application for a writ of habeas corpus following the conclusion of state proceedings); Jessie A.
Seiden and Priya Nath, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 179, 191-93 (2003) (discussing the statute of
limitations applicable to federal habeas petitions in Virginia and analyzing Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d
238 (4th Cir. 2003)). A 180-day statute of limitations applies in jurisdictions that have opted into
28 U.S.C S 2263. Sw 28 U.S.C 5 2263(a) (2000) (providing 180 days to file a federal application for
a writ of habeas corpus following the conclusion of state proceedings).
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reopening of the Ford claim is not another application.'" So long as the initial
habeas petition includes the Ford claim and meets the statute of limitations in
2244, the claim is preserved for later proceedings.
In the alternative, the statute of limitations could potentially be avoided by
using Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of avil Procedure to file a Motion to
Reserve Judgment on the Issue of Incompetence to be Executed during the first
federal habeas proceeding.167 This motion allows the court to reserve judgment
of the Fori claim until it is ripe and statute of limitations issues are avoided. 6
Further, a Rule 54(b) "motion does not inhibit the defendant's ability to appeal
on other grounds because the court's final judgment on the remaining issues
constitutes a final decision that is appealable under S 1291."169
V. Cbadwion
The Fourth CArcuit held that, on all of Walton's claims, he failed to make a
substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. Therefore, the court
denied Walton a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal. This case
demonstrates the necessityof asserting anyobjections to appointed mental health
experts at the time of their appointment at trial, and the necessity of maintaining
any Ford claims on all appellate and habeas proceedings. Practitioners should
ensure that theytake the extra steps necessaryto prevent the procedural default
of any of these issues.
Tenence T. Egland
166. S Stewuur, 523 US. at 643-44 ("The Court of Appeals was ... correct in holding that
respondent was not required to get authorization to file a 'second or successive' application before
his Foni claim could be heard.").
167. FED.R. Qv. P. 54(b); Grunewald, s"m note 28, at 520 (outlining a Rule 54(b) argument).
168. Grunewald, sup note 28, at 520.
169. Id; 28 U.S.C S 1291 (2000) (granting jurisdiction to the courts of appeal for all final
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